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REVENUE SHARING IN 401(K) PLANS: EMPLOYERS AS
MONITORS?
DANA M. MUIR*
***
This article presents a discussion of the use of revenue sharing by mutual
funds and 401(k) plan service providers. The author engages in a
historical exploration of how revenue sharing has been used in 401(k)
plans and highlights how regulators have taken an increased interest in
ensuring disclosure of fund monies diverted for revenue sharing purposes.
In addition, the article discusses how the current federal regulatory
framework for employee benefits has not adapted to the increased use of
401(k) plans. The author challenges how ERISA places the burden of
monitoring compensation to service providers on the employers who make
the 401(k) plan available to their employees and instead, presents several
alternative frameworks that would decrease employer responsibility and
liability for investment selection.
***
Employees have maligned the use of revenue sharing1 in 401(k)
plans as a burden on investment returns and a hidden source of wealth for
plan service providers.3 A few commentators have been shrill in their
2

*

Arthur F. Thurnau Professor of Business Law, Stephen M. Ross School of
Business at the University of Michigan. dmuir@umich.edu. 734.763.3091. I
appreciate the research support provided by Michigan Ross. Thank you to the
organizers of the 2013 symposium at the University of Connecticut School of Law,
The Challenge of Retirement in a Defined Contribution World, which helped me
sharpen my thinking on a variety of issues, including those I discuss in this Article.
I have served as an expert witness in a 401(k) case that involved revenue sharing.
1
For a discussion of the nuances of the definition of revenue sharing, see infra
text accompanying notes 23–27.
2
401(k) plans are employer-sponsored benefit plans that permit employees to
contribute a portion of their future earnings to the plan. EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW
6–15 (Jeffrey Lewis et al. eds., 3rd ed. 2012).
3
See, e.g., Healthcare Strategies, Inc. v. ING Life Ins. & Annuity Co., No.
3:11-CV-282, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184544, at *3–4 (D. Conn. Sept. 27, 2012)
(ruling on various motions in a case where plaintiffs alleged that revenue sharing in
a 401(k) plan violated federal law); see also Matthew D. Hutcheson, Uncovering
and Understanding Hidden Fees in Qualified Retirement Plans, 15 ELDER L.J. 323,
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criticism of revenue sharing.4 Service providers have responded that
traditionally they did not have any obligation to report or limit the amount
of revenue sharing they received and that revenue sharing has supported
growth and innovation in 401(k) plans.5 Policy groups have concluded that
the use of revenue sharing in 401(k) plans is widespread and not
necessarily pernicious.6 Given the varying perspectives of the parties, none
of that is surprising or particularly troubling.
What is troubling, however, is the extent to which responsibility
for alleged misuse of or failure to monitor revenue sharing in 401(k) plans
is laid at the feet of employers who voluntarily sponsor those plans. In my
view, this assignment of responsibility for decision making and oversight is
just one example of a larger issue – an antiquated regulatory model of
employer responsibility in 401(k) plans.7 To maximize the opportunity of
employees to build lifelong financial security through the United States
paradigm of voluntary plan sponsorship, it is imperative that the regulatory
system properly allocate responsibility and liability. My goal in this
Article is modest; I will evaluate the way in which the federal law that

328 (2007) (“‘Revenue sharing’ is a euphemism for kickbacks from one financial
services firm to another and is a common economic driver of conflicts of
interest.”).
4
See Hutcheson, supra note 3, at 328 (“‘Revenue sharing’ is a euphemism for
kickbacks from one financial service firm to another . . . .”); Cris de la Torre &
Rutilio Martinez, Mutual Fund Revenue Sharing: A Case of Pay to Play, 4 J. PERS.
FIN. 47, 48 (2005) (“‘[R]evenue sharing’ . . . looks very much like a ‘pay to play’
practice associated with the supermarkets and shelf space . . .”).
5
See, e.g., Leimkuehler v. Am. United Life Ins. Co., 713 F.3d 905, 914 (7th
Cir. 2013) (finding that plan administrator was not a fiduciary with respect to
revenue sharing it received).
6
ERISA ADVISORY COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON
FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITIES AND REVENUE SHARING PRACTICES (2007),
available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/AC-1107b.html (“[R]evenuesharing in a broad sense allows the market ‘to develop efficiencies and innovations
that have enhanced the quality of services of products available to [defined
contribution] and 401(k) plans.’”).
7
See Dana M. Muir, Choice Architecture and the Locus of Fiduciary
Obligation in Defined Contribution Plans, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2013) (criticizing
assignment of responsibility to employers for selection and oversight of plan
investment options).
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regulates benefit plans, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA),8 applies to the use of revenue sharing in 401(k) plans.
I begin this Article with a discussion of the history of revenue
sharing in 401(k) plans and how that history relates to the use of revenue
sharing outside plans. The discussion shows that revenue sharing has
become an integral part of 401(k) plan history. In Part II, I assess the
limited information that has been available on the prevalence of revenue
sharing in 401(k) plans. Until the early-to-mid 2000s, little attention
appears to have been paid to revenue sharing except by those who pay and
receive it. That Part also considers innovations in 401(k) plans, which may
have been supported by the use of revenue sharing.
In Part III, I briefly explain the extent to which federal employee
benefits regulation applies to the use of revenue sharing in 401(k) plans. In
contrast to federal disclosure requirements, the governing fiduciary
framework has not adapted to the increased importance and complexity of
401(k) plans.
ERISA’s fiduciary standards do not impose any
responsibility or liability regarding revenue sharing on the mutual funds
that pay it or the plan service providers that receive it. Instead, employers
bear the burden of assessing the practice. The potential liability of
employers regarding revenue sharing is comprised of two primary
responsibilities: employers must (1) ensure that compensation to plan
service providers is reasonable and (2) act loyally and prudently when
choosing and monitoring the investments that employees may make
through the 401(k) plan. In Part IV, I raise the question of whether
employers are the best-positioned actors among the constellation of planrelated actors to monitor revenue sharing. I end by briefly outlining
alternative regulatory structures that would reallocate responsibility away
from employers.
I.

HISTORY OF REVENUE SHARING IN 401(K) PLANS

The development and expansion of 401(k) plans supported growth
in the mutual fund industry and has been linked from the relatively early
days of those plans with the use of revenue sharing. The addition of

8

Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93–406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 29
U.S.C.).
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subsection (k)9 to Section 40110 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) in
1978 first permitted what have come to be known as 401(k) plans. At that
time, defined benefit (DB) plans, which typically provide guaranteed
lifetime incomes, were the paradigmatic type of retirement plan in the
United States.11 The original purpose of the 1978 amendment was to clarify
that employees could contribute to benefit plans through salary reductions,
not to remake the U.S. system of private sector retirement plans.12
The number of 401(k) plans grew after the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) issued explanatory regulations in 1981.13 As of 1996, 401(k)
plan accounts held $1 trillion in assets. By the end of 2005, 401(k) plans
had surpassed DB plans in terms of numbers of participants (employees
and their beneficiaries who are entitled to plan benefits) and assets. 401(k)
plans continue to be the most prevalent type of retirement plan sponsored
by private sector employers. 401(k) plan assets grew from $2.4 trillion in
2005 to almost $3.8 trillion as of March 31, 2013.14
According to one report, in the early days of 401(k) plans, some
employers were reluctant to handle plan administration services such as:
(a) communications,; (b) acting as the liaison between participants, mutual
9

Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, §135(a), 92 Stat. 2763, 2785
(Nov. 6, 1978).
10
I.R.C. § 401(k) (2006).
11
Other types of retirement plans were so insignificant at that time that they
were not even included in the National Compensation Survey. See EMP. BENEFIT
RESEARCH INST., EBRI DATABOOK ON EMPLOYEE BENEFITS Table 10.1(a) (2005),
available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/books/databook/DB.Chapter%
2010.pdf.
12
See EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., HISTORY OF 401(K) PLANS: AN UPDATE
(2005), available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/facts/0205fact.a.pdf.
13
Dana M. Muir, The Dichotomy Between Investment Advice and Investment
Education: Is No Advice Really the Best Advice?, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
1, 6 (2002).
14
SARAH HOLDEN ET AL., 401(K) PLANS: A 25-YEAR RETROSPECTIVE 3
(2006), available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/per12-02.pdf; SARAH HOLDEN &
DANIEL SCHRASS, DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLAN PARTICIPANTS’ ACTIVITIES,
FIRST
QUARTER
2013
2
(July
2013),
available
at
http://www.ici.org/pdf/ppr_13_rec_survey_q1.pdf. Comparatively, in 2005, DB
plans held $1.9 trillion in assets and $2.7 trillion as of March 31, 2013. Holden et
al., supra; Robert Steyer, ICI: Retirement Assets Total $20.8 Trillion in First
&
INVESTMENTS,
June
26,
2013,
Quarter
2013,
PENSIONS
http://www.pionline.com/article/20130626/ONLINE/130629908/ici-us-retirementassets-hit-record-208-trillion.
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funds; and (c) trading. While there is no data on why employers decided
not to handle these functions themselves, the administration of investment
accounts is not among the core competencies of most employers. It makes
sense that third parties could perform the functions more efficiently than if
each employer had to develop and maintain its own staff and capabilities.
Consulting firms apparently spotted the business opportunity and began to
perform the necessary administrative plan functions. Perhaps to compete
on the direct costs that were most visible to employers choosing among
service providers, in the early 1990s, those service providers began to seek
payments – revenue sharing -- from the mutual funds that were offered as
investments in 401(k) plans.15
In theory, instead of making payments to consulting firms, the
mutual funds themselves could have developed the expertise to provide
administrative services to 401(k) plans. Eventually, as the industry and
401(k) plans grew, large fund families developed the capabilities needed to
offer plan administrative services.16 During the 1990s, however, it appears
that at least some mutual funds concentrated on their investment expertise
and chose not to deal directly with investors or employers that sponsored
401(k) plans. For sales to investors who were not 401(k) plan participants,
mutual funds relied on brokers and personal investment advisers to handle
the interactions with investors, including communications, customer
service, and trading. The mutual funds compensated the brokers and
investment advisers for those services by paying them a portion of the
funds’ revenue (an early form of revenue sharing).17 The revenue sharing to
the service providers that fulfilled parallel functions in 401(k) plans
mirrored the practice used by the funds outside 401(k) plans.
Modern mutual funds pre-date 1940, when the Investment
Company Act of 194018 was enacted to regulate the industry. In 1981,
15

Whose

McHenry Consulting Group, Revenue Sharing in the 401(k) Marketplace:
Money
Is
It?,
3
(2001),
available
at

http://www.plansponsor.com/pdfs/
White%20Papers/McHenry_Rev_Share_Report.pdf.
16
See, e.g., Tussey v. ABB, Inc., No. 2:06-CV-04305-NKL, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 45240, at *7 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012) (discussing the various plan-related
roles played by affiliates of Fidelity Investments).
17
John Howat & Linda Reid, Compensation Practices for Retail Sale of
Mutual Funds: The Need for Transparency and Disclosure, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP.
& FIN. L. 685, 687-94 (2007).
18
Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, 54 Stat. 789 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1-64 (2006)).
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when the IRS issued the first 401(k) regulations, U.S. mutual funds held
assets of just over $241 billion.19 As 401(k) plans grew in assets and
popularity, so did mutual funds. The fate of the two is linked because a
significant percentage of the assets invested in mutual fund assets are
typically held in retirement plan accounts. By the end of 2005, mutual
funds held almost $8.1 trillion in assets, and that number grew to more than
$13 trillion at the end of 2012.20 At that time, $2.7 trillion of those assets
were held in defined contribution plans.21
In 1980, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
promulgated Rule 12b-1,22 which formalized the ability of mutual funds to
use fund assets to pay for marketing and distribution costs. Here, a brief
detour into terminology is warranted. The securities industry and its
commentators typically break payments made from mutual funds into more
categories than is typical of the employee benefits industry and its
commentators. For example, in an article focused on securities law,
Professors Howat and Reid discussed a variety of “enhanced compensation
arrangements”23 used by mutual funds. They explained revenue sharing as
“occur[ring] when a fund manager agrees to pay a brokerage firm cash
compensation not otherwise disclosed in the prospectus fee table to
promote the mutual fund to the broker’s clients.”24 They separately define
12b–1 fees, which are paid by mutual funds out of fund assets rather than
by the fund manager, as a separate category of fees.25 As for other
categories of enhanced compensation practices they discuss “directed
brokerage,” “soft dollar practices,” and “differential cash compensation.”26
Often, the employee benefits community includes any payments made from
mutual funds or their managers in its use of the term revenue sharing.27 In
19

INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 2013 Investment Company Fact Book
142 (2013), available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/2013_factbook.pdf.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 132. The report does not break out 401(k) account holdings from the
more inclusive category of defined contribution accounts. Id.
22
Bearing of Distribution Expenses by Mutual Funds, Investment Company
Act Release No. 11,414, 45 Fed. Reg. 73,898 (Nov. 7, 1980).
23
Howat & Reid, supra note 17, at 687.
24
Id. at 689–90.
25
See id. at 694 (stating that the expense ratio of a fund typically includes an
advisory fee, administrative fee and 12b-1 fees).
26
Id. at 688–91.
27
See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO), GAO-12-325,
401(K) PLANS: INCREASED EDUCATIONAL OUTREACH AND BROADER OVERSIGHT
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employee benefits parlance, revenue sharing includes both its narrow
securities law definition and other amounts paid by mutual funds, such as
12b-1 fees. Unless otherwise specifically noted, in this Article, I use the
term “revenue sharing” in this broad sense, as defined by the employee
benefits community.
The now well-known brokerage company, Charles Schwab
Corporation (Schwab), is credited with using the concept of revenue
sharing to establish a 401(k) plan paradigm that remains in widespread use
today. In 1992, it first offered what it described as an “innovative service,”
which allowed investors to choose among multiple mutual funds from a
variety of fund families rather than being limited to a single fund family
and to do so without paying any direct fees to Schwab for administering
their accounts.28 As with other mutual fund practices, such as revenue
sharing where mutual funds used parallel approaches for individual
investors and 401(k) plans,29 Schwab offered its new innovation to 401(k)
plan sponsors as well as to individual investors. In the 401(k) offering,
Schwab provided record keeping services, including a single statement for
participants showing their investments in all funds. Schwab originally
referred to this as a “no transaction fee” (NTF) program. Reportedly,
“Schwab eliminated transactions costs, supporting the platform on revenue
generated by fund distribution commissions and servicing fees.”30 In simple
terms, Schwab’s NTF model relied on revenue sharing to pay for all of the
services that Schwab provided to 401(k) plans or to individual investors.
As discussed below, the use of revenue sharing to offset plan costs
continues to be in widespread use to this day.

MAY HELP REDUCE PLAN FEES 10 (2012), available at http://www.gao.
gov/assets/600/590359.pdf (defining revenue sharing “in the 401(k) plan industry,
[as] generally referr[ing] to indirect payments made from one service provider,
such as the investment fund provider, to another service provider in connection
with services provided to the plan, rather than payments made directly by the plan
sponsor for plan services.”).
28
Charles Schwab, Schwab’s Mutual Fund OneSource® at 20: How a Single
Idea Transformed the Way America Invests at 4 (2012), available at
http://www.aboutschwab.com/images/press/071612MFOSWhitePaper.pdf.
29
See supra notes 15–17 and accompanying text.
30
McHenry Consulting Group, supra note 15, at 3.
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REVENUE SHARING IN 401(K) PLANS – SCOPE AND
EFFECT

Little reliable historical data exists on the growth and amount of
revenue sharing that has been paid within 401(k) plans. However, as the
first subsection below discusses, the available evidence indicates that the
dollar volume of revenue sharing is substantial and the practice is widely
used. To provide some context for the way revenue sharing may redound
to the benefit of 401(k) plan participants, the following subsection
discusses the complexity of plan administration and services.
A.

SCOPE OF REVENUE SHARING IN 401(K) PLANS

Plans were not required to report revenue sharing until 2009, when
the Department of Labor (DOL) began requiring reporting of those
payments as part of large plans’ annual reporting.31 To this day, securities
law requires reporting of 12b-1 fees, but not those fees paid by fund
managers that are known as revenue sharing in the securities law
community.32 As one data point in 2006, 12b-1 fees paid by all mutual
funds, not just those held in 401(k) accounts and excluding revenue sharing
as used in the securities context, totaled $11.8 billion.33
It appears that plan fees and employer responsibilities for
understanding those fees started to become of interest to regulators in the
late 1990s. The DOL commissioned a study of 401(k) fees which
culminated in a report entitled “Study of 401(k) Plan Fees and Expenses.”34
That report explicitly discussed 12b-1 and other types of fees35 but did not
use the term “revenue sharing.” However, it recognizes the general
concept that “[i]n the case of mutual fund expense ratios or where the
investment management fees are otherwise incorporated in net asset
31

See Michele A. Rivas, Fee Disclosures by Service Providers to Benefit
Plans: How to Protect Your Clients, 34 MI. TAX L. 11, 12-13 (2008). Plans do not
always need to report revenue sharing separately from other types of compensation
paid to plan service providers. Id. at 13.
32
See Howat & Reid, supra note 17, at 689–96.
33
John P. Freeman, The Mutual Fund Distribution Expense Mess, 32 IOWA J.
CORP. L. 739, 744 (2007).
34
PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., ECONOMIC SYSTEMS, INC., STUDY
401(K)
PLAN
FEES
AND
EXPENSES
(1998),
available
at
OF
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/401kRept.pdf.
35
See id. at 3.3.5.
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valuation computations, participants pay all of the fees.”36 In addition to the
study, in 1997, the DOL held hearings on the transparency of fees in 401(k)
plans. The extent to which employers and participants would benefit from
increased transparency was somewhat controversial.37
In spite of the amount of revenue sharing changing hands and its
role in 401(k) plan innovation, the first report I have found that explicitly
refers to revenue sharing as such in the context of 401(k) plans was issued
by the McHenry Consulting Group in 2001.38 That report, titled “RevenueSharing in the 401(k) Marketplace,” explained that U.S. securities laws
permit mutual fund companies to share their revenues with service
providers to 401(k) plans. According to the report, “Almost every
investment and administration service provider engages in this activity to
some degree. It is virtually impossible to compete in the 401(k)
marketplace without subsidies to help offset service costs, as provided by
asset-based revenues.”39 It also provides some general information about
the costs of plan services and the kinds of services that affect costs.40
A policy advisory group to the DOL, known as the ERISA
Advisory Council,41 of which I was a member at the time, studied revenue
sharing in 2004. In my experience, each year, the ERISA Advisory
Council members choose approximately three issues to consider. Working
groups are constituted to study those issues. ERISA Advisory Council
members then volunteer to serve on any or all of the working groups,
according to interest and expertise.
The 2004 working group on plan fees and reporting on Form 5500
(Fees and Reporting Working Group) heard testimony over multiple days
from a number of industry participants about plan fees, and some of those

36

Id. at 5.3.2.
See id. at 5.3.3 (reporting that the disclosure to sponsors and participants of
fees and expenses imposed on 401(k) plans is often not complete and that this lack
of information may affect the costs to the plans).
38
McHenry Consulting Group, supra note 15.
39
Id. at 4.
40
Id. at 5–6.
41
ERISA Advisory Councils are comprised of fifteen member groups of
citizens appointed for staggered three-year terms by the Secretary of Labor. Pub. L.
93-406, tit. I, § 512, 88 Stat. 895 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1142 (2006)). I
was a member of the ERISA Advisory Council from 2002–2004, and was a
member of both the working group that studied plan fees and reporting and the one
that studied fee and related disclosures to participants.
37
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witnesses discussed revenue sharing.42 As is typical, the working group’s
final report includes summaries of the testimony of each witness and the
group’s overall findings based on the testimony. The report confirms that
the data available to the employee benefit plans community on revenue
sharing were limited. A number of the witnesses discussed the lack of
transparency of plan fees and revenue-sharing arrangements.43 None of the
witnesses that I remember advanced a legal theory under which service
providers had any obligation to disclose revenue sharing unless asked by an
employer. Nor were revenue-sharing disclosures required as part of plans’
annual reporting to the DOL.
In spite of the lack of specific data, the working group’s
conclusions reflect the testimony that 401(k) plan service providers often
relied on revenue sharing to compensate them in full or part for the services
they provided to the plan.44 In its findings, the Fees and Reporting
Working Group wrote: “[t]he testimony established that explicit charges in
many plans have been substantially reduced or nearly completely
eliminated and the majority of costs associated with administering many
retirement plans are now embedded in the form of asset-based fees and
borne by the plan participants.”45 The report recommended that the DOL
study regarding the reporting of plan fees, including the use of revenue
sharing, should be required.46
At least two other direct or indirect references to revenue sharing
and 401(k) plans date to 2004. A second working group of the 2004
ERISA Advisory Council focused on the somewhat different issue of how
fee disclosures related to participant investment elections.47 That group’s
final report did not directly discuss revenue sharing, except to the extent
that specific witnesses used the term and it became part of the summaries

42

See ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EMP. WELFARE & PENSION BENEFIT PLANS,
REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON PLAN FEES AND REPORTING ON FORM 5500
(2004),
available
at
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa
/publications/AC_111804_report.html.
43
See, e.g., id. at 10.
44
Id. at 2.
45
Id. at 5.
46
Id. at 3.
47
See ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EMP. WELFARE & PENSION BENEFITS PLANS,
REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON FEE AND RELATED DISCLOSURES TO
PARTICIPANTS (2004), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/AC_
111704_report.html.
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of the individual testimony.48 In addition, the New York Times quoted an
employee of a prominent benefits consulting firm as stating that “90% of
401(k) plans engage in revenue sharing.”49
Interest in and discussion about the prevalence of revenue sharing
in 401(k) plans has continued. In 2007, another working group of the
ERISA Advisory Council studied fiduciary responsibilities and revenuesharing practices. In introducing its findings on revenue sharing, the report
states, “[t]he Working Group recognized that there was a considerable
amount of consensus with respect to the concept of revenue sharing, how it
can benefit plan sponsors and their participants.”50 The first of its four
consensus thoughts was that “[r]evenue sharing is an acceptable practice.”51
The prevalence of revenue sharing is implicit in those statements and
throughout the report. The report also reflects a belief that revenue sharing
pays for plan services that would have to be paid for in some other way in
the absence of revenue sharing. “[T]he Working Group recognized that
revenue sharing was a common and considerable practice used to offset
plan expenses with respect to [defined contribution] plans.”52
Today, revenue sharing continues to be widely used in 401(k) plans
and to attract the attention of commentators and policy makers. In a 2011
report on fees in the 401(k) plan marketplace, Deloitte reported survey
results showing that 55 percent of the responding plan sponsors reported
that “all of the record-keeping and administrative fees are paid through
investment revenue.”53 In 2012, the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) released the results of its study of 401(k) plan fees, which is
discussed in more detail below.54 The DOL has also imposed a variety of
mandatory reporting requirements regarding plan fees and the use of
revenue sharing.55
48

Id. at 13, 18.
Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries, 158 U.
PA. L. REV. 1961, 2004 n.269 (2010) (quoting Lynn O’Shaughnessy, A 401(k)
Picks a Mutual Fund. Who Gets a Perk?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2004, at BU5).
50
ERISA Advisory Council, supra note 6, at 3.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 1-2.
53
DELOITTE ET AL., ANNUAL 401(K) BENCHMARKING SURVEY 24 (2011),
available at http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/
Documents/us_consulting_Deloitte%20401k%20Survey_2011%20edition_120820
11.pdf.
54
GAO, supra note 27; see also infra text accompanying notes 114-17.
55
See infra text accompanying notes Part III.A.
49
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EFFECT OF REVENUE SHARING IN 401(K) PLANS

Since Schwab created the NTF model in 1992, 401(k) plans have
added services to participants, increased the average number of investment
options they offer participants, and complied with increasing regulatory
obligations. Plans now face far more extensive regulatory requirements
than at the time 401(k) plans began.56
The costs of these elaborate and extensive services may be shared
between employers and employees, but employees usually pay the largest
share. One survey shows that 83 percent of all fees associated with 401(k)
plans are paid by plan participants. Most of those payments are made
through revenue sharing. The survey also notes that some of the revenue
sharing may pay for plan administration, including recordkeeping.57
The main concern that seems to be expressed about the effect of
revenue sharing on 401(k) plan participants is the lack of transparency
associated with revenue sharing. According to one commentator, Matthew
Hutcheson,58 “[r]evenue sharing is the ‘big secret’ of the retirement

56

See, e.g., DEP’T OF LABOR, FINAL REGULATION RELATING TO SERVICE
PROVIDER DISCLOSURES UNDER SECTION 408 (B)(2): FACT SHEET (2012),
available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/newsroom/fs408b2finalreg.html (explaining
the obligation of service providers to disclose compensation to plan fiduciaries,
which implies the obligation of plan fiduciaries to evaluate those disclosures);
DEP’T OF LABOR, FINAL RULE TO IMPROVE TRANSPARENCY OF FEES AND
EXPENSES TO WORKERS IN 401(K)-TYPE RETIREMENT PLANS: FACT SHEET (2012),
available
at
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/newsroom/fsparticipantfeerule.html
(explaining final regulations requiring plans to disclose plan fees to participants);
DEP’T OF LABOR, REGULATION RELATING TO QUALIFIED DEFAULT INVESTMENT
ALTERNATIVES IN PARTICIPANT-DIRECTED INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNT PLANS (2008),
available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/newsroom/fsQDIA.html (explaining the
effect of and requirements for a 401(k) plan offering a "qualified default
investment alternative.").
57
DELOITTE, INSIDE THE STRUCTURE OF DEFINED CONTRIBUTION/401(K) PLAN
FEES: A STUDY ASSESSING THE MECHANICS OF THE ‘ALL-IN’ FEE 5 (2011),
available at https://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/
Documents /us_consulting_StructureofDefineContribution_112411.pdf.
58
In 2013, Mr. Hutcheson was sentenced to prison after being convicted of
wire fraud in connection with his service as a retirement plan fiduciary. See U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Eagle Man Sentenced to Over 17 Years in Prison for Theft from
Retirement Plans (July 31, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/usao/id/news/2013/jul/
hutcheson07312013.html.
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industry.”59 Some witnesses to the ERISA Advisory Council’s 2004 Fees
and Reporting Working Group expressed the view that neither participants
nor plan sponsors had a good understanding of revenue sharing.60 Mr.
Hutcheson feared that revenue sharing “impair[s] the retirement income
security of participants,”61 and could result in fiduciary liability for plan
sponsors who fail to consider these costs when making decisions regarding
plan service providers.62
However, to the extent that sponsors with that plan face fiduciary
liability because of the lack of transparency in revenue sharing, one
response – and the one I advocate later in this Article – is that the system
has it wrong when it allocates fiduciary responsibility for revenue sharingrelated decision making to plan sponsors.63 If, as the 2007 ERISA Working
Group found, revenue sharing has encouraged the development of
important services to participants and enhanced the popularity of 401(k)
plans, then it would seem to have accomplished the opposite of impairing
retirement security.
It is important to recognize that the array of functions provided by
401(k) plan service providers is very broad. Those functions include
account statements, educational programs and materials, investment
transactions, call centers, web sites, etc., that provide information and
receive transaction orders, process plan loans, distributions, roll-overs,
contributions, and court orders to divide 401(k) plan accounts upon a
participant’s divorce, etc. Some of these services, such as account
statements, are required by law.64 Others, such as call centers and websites,
are not required but provide participants with enhanced access to
information about their accounts and efficient methods of implementing
investment decisions. Service providers may perform a variety of other
services, such as preparing annual reports the plan must file with the DOL65

59

Hutcheson, supra note 3, at 328.
ERISA Advisory Council, supra note 42, at 9-10, 12.
61
Hutcheson, supra note 3, at 328.
62
Id.
63
See infra text accompanying notes 146-48.
64
See, e.g., ERISA § 105(a)(1)(A)(i), 29 U.S.C. § 1025(a)(1)(A)(i) (2006)
(requiring plans that permit participants to choose their investments to provide a
benefits statement at least quarterly).
65
See, e.g., ERISA § 103, 29 U.S.C. § 1023 (2006) (requiring plans to file
annual reports). Filing Form 5500 with the DOL fulfills this reporting requirement.
See Fisch, supra note 49, at 1986 (briefly discussing Form 5500 filing obligations).
60
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and holding account assets in trust66 to enable plans to comply with legal
requirements. Finally, 401(k) service providers may undertake functions
such as investment recordkeeping and serving as the interface between
participants and investment providers such as mutual funds. One
commentator identified fourteen different entities or people that may
receive payments from 401(k) plan assets for services provided to those
plans.67
The
complexity
of
plan
recordkeeping,
participant
communications, and similar services may also be affected by the
investment choices offered to plan participants. The investment options
from which participants may choose, often referred to as the investment
menu, have increased from an average of six in 1995 to fourteen in 2005.68
When new financial products are developed, that can raise the question of
whether those products are suitable for 401(k) plans.69
The services provided by 401(k) plans redound to the benefit of
plan participants and enable them to build wealth in those plans. Providers
of those 401(k) plan services must be compensated in some way for their
services. As explained above, the norm has become to pay for some or all
of the costs through revenue sharing. One prominent scholar explained it
this way: “the employees bear the costs of running the plan but pay those
66

ERISA § 403(a), 29 U.S.C. §1103 (2006).
Hutcheson, supra note 3, at 344-47; see also GAO, supra note 27, at 7-9
(discussing the variety of plan service providers and how services may be
combined, which is referred to in the industry as bundled services).
68
Holden et al., supra note 14, at 17. It is useful to note, however, that work
by behavioral economists indicates that it is better for retirement participants to
have only a small number of investment options because too large a set of options
may discourage participants from participating in the plan. Sheena S. Iyengar et al.,
How Much Choice Is Too Much?: Contributions to 401(k) Retirement Plans, in
PENSION DESIGN AND STRUCTURE: NEW LESSONS FROM BEHAVIORAL
FINANCE, 83-95 (Olivia S. Mitchell & Stephen P. Utkus eds., 2004). One important
strategy that has been successful in increasing plan participation is to automatically
enroll participants in plans while also providing them the opportunity to actively
opt out. See Dana M. Muir, Default Settings in Defined Contribution Plans: A
Comparative Approach to Fiduciary Obligation and the Role of Markets, 28
A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 59, 60-61 (2012) (outlining the use of defaults in 401(k)
plans).
69
See, e.g., William A. Birdthistle, The Fortunes and Foibles of ExchangeTraded Funds: A Positive Market Response to the Problems of Mutual Funds, 33
DEL. J. CORP. L. 69, 74 (2008) (discussing the possibility that 401(k) plan menus
might include exchange-traded funds (ETFs)).
67
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costs indirectly through the fees charged to them by the participating
mutual funds.”70
Arguably, revenue sharing has had a positive effect on the
popularity of 401(k) plans and on the breadth of services the plans provide
to participants. This was the view of the 2007 ERISA Working Group,
which wrote: “revenue-sharing in a broad sense allows the market ‘to
develop efficiencies and innovations that have enhanced the quality of
services of products available to [defined contribution] and 401(k)
plans.’”71 The report also states: “[t]he witnesses generally testified, and the
Working Group recognizes that revenue sharing supports a wide variety of
distribution and shareholder servicing activities, including administrative
record keeping and sub-transfer agent services that were traditionally
viewed as investment fund responsibilities.”72
III.

THE ROLE OF EMPLOYERS IN MONITORING REVENUE
SHARING

Federal pension regulation applies a two-prong approach to
revenue-sharing. One component relies on disclosure and the other on
substantive fiduciary obligation. This Part addresses each of those in turn.
The analysis shows that employers bear the primary fiduciary burden vis-àvis the use of revenue sharing in 401(k) plans. It further reveals that
employers’ fiduciary obligation with respect to revenue sharing is
comprised of two main components: (i) the obligation to ensure that
compensation to plan service providers is reasonable; and (ii) the need to
act loyally and prudently when choosing and monitoring products for the
plan’s investment menu.
A. DISCLOSURE OF REVENUE SHARING IN 401(K) PLANS
During the past five years, the DOL has overhauled the reporting
of the compensation received by employee benefit plan service providers,
including their receipt of revenue-sharing. The first disclosure obligation
became effective in 2009 when large plans73 were required to identify in
70

Fisch, supra note 49, at 2004-05.
ERISA ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 6.
72
Id.
73
Large plans typically are those with at least one hundred participants. As of
2005, approximately 86 percent of those participating in a 401(k) plan were in a
71
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the annual reports they file with the DOL all service providers who directly
or indirectly receive more than $5,000 compensation during the plan year
covered by the reporting.74 Although this increased the transparency of
service provider compensation, gaps remained.
The definition of
compensation was broad enough to include revenue sharing.75 However, in
certain situations, revenue sharing can be included with other types of
compensation rather than being separately reported.76 Second, nothing in
this annual reporting requirement required service providers to disclose
their compensation to plan sponsors.77 When plan sponsors did not have
compensation information from the service providers, the plan sponsors
could meet their disclosure obligation by identifying service providers and
noting the lack of information.78
The next prong of the DOL’s effort to increase the transparency of
401(k) fees became effective in 2012 when it issued final regulations
requiring plan service providers that receive at least $1,000 annually in
plan-related compensation to disclose their total compensation to plan
fiduciaries.79 In turn, the plan now must disclose administrative fees and
expenses to plan participants.80 Guidance issued by the DOL makes clear
that both sets of disclosure requirements include revenue sharing.81
In addition to providing information to plan sponsors and
participants, disclosures of plan administrative fees and expenses may be of
large plan. See Debra A. Davis, How Much is Enough? Giving Fiduciaries and
Participants Adequate Information About Plan Expenses, 41 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
1005, 1022 (2008).
74
Id. at 1023.
75
See DEP’T OF LABOR, Frequently Asked Questions: The 2009 Form 5500
Schedule C, Q14, http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/faqs/faq_scheduleC .html.
76
See id.
77
Davis, supra note 73, at 1023.
78
See id.
79
DEP’T OF LABOR, FINAL REGULATION RELATING TO SERVICE PROVIDER
DISCLOSURES UNDER SECTION 408(B)(2): FACT SHEET 2 (2012), available at
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/newsroom/fs408b2finalreg.html.
80
DEP’T OF LABOR, FINAL RULE TO IMPROVE TRANSPARENCY OF THE FEES
AND EXPENSES TO WORKERS IN 401(K)-TYPE RETIREMENT PLANS: FACT SHEET 2
(2012), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/newsroom/fsparticipantfeerule.
html.
81
See DEP’T OF LABOR , FEE DISCLOSURE GUIDANCE, FIELD ASSISTANCE
BULLETIN 2012 – 02 (2012), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/regs/
fab2012-2.html.
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value to other interested parties. The tax-advantaged nature of 401(k) plans
means that a variety of government agencies, including the Internal
Revenue Service, may have an interest in the information. Securities
analysts, independent researchers, and competitors of both plan sponsors
and plan service providers may also find the information useful.
It is too early to tell whether the benefits of increased disclosure
outweigh its costs. The reporting is complex82 and commentators question
the extent to which it is understood by either employers or employees.83 As
described below, plan service providers have an interest in making it
difficult for employers to compare fees across plan providers.84 The GAO’s
2012 report discusses the extent to which employers have been comparing
fees and, even after 2009, remain confused about plan fees and the role that
revenue sharing plays in compensating plan service providers.85
B.

FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITY AND REVENUE SHARING IN
401(K) PLANS

In addition to the relatively recent disclosure obligations just
discussed, ERISA’s fiduciary standards apply to revenue-sharing. This
subsection explains ERISA’s basic fiduciary requirements and how those
requirements apply to the various parties involved in the use of revenuesharing in 401(k) plans. It then explains the extent to which employers
bear the primary fiduciary obligation in authorizing and monitoring the use
of revenue-sharing in those plans.
When functioning as an ERISA fiduciary, individuals and entities
must act loyally86 and in accordance with a standard of care defined as that
of a prudent person familiar with the benefit plan matters at issue.87 To
82

See, e.g., Reasonable Contract or Arrangement Under Section 408(b)(2) –
Fee Disclosure, 77 C.F.R. § 5632 (containing a preamble in excess of 18 pages
before the regulatory impact analysis).
83
See Mark Mensack, The Moral Hazard of Too Big to Jail, J. COMP. &
BENEFITS 42, 45 (2013) (discussing the frustration of some plan sponsors in trying
to evaluate the feed disclosures).
84
See infra text accompanying notes 118-20.
85
GAO, supra note 27, at 24-28.
86
ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A)(i), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(i) (2006) ("solely in
the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and . . . for the exclusive purpose
of . . . providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries.").
87
See ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (2006); see also 29
C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1 (1997) (explaining the application of the prudence standard
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supplement these trust law-based, general fiduciary standards, ERISA
contains what are known as prohibited transactions provisions. One set of
those provisions bars transactions between a plan and certain specified
parties that have relationships with plans, including plan service providers,
unless an exemption applies.88
ERISA utilizes a functional definition of fiduciary, which means
that any person or entity that engages in actions involving discretionary
plan administration, asset or plan management, or investment advice acts as
a fiduciary.89 This broad definition could lead a reasonable person to think
that the mutual funds that pay revenue sharing, the service providers that
administer plans and receive revenue sharing from account assets, and the
employers who sponsor plans all act as ERISA fiduciaries. ERISA has a
way, however, of confounding the expectations of reasonable people.
ERISA’s fiduciary definition explicitly excludes from its scope the
mutual funds that pay revenue sharing. Although the functional definition
of fiduciary includes persons or entities that engage in discretionary asset
management, the definition clarifies that investments of plan assets in
mutual funds do not cause the mutual fund or its advisor to become an
ERISA fiduciary.90 It appears that Congress’ rationale for the exclusion
when it enacted ERISA, which was well before the existence of 401(k)
plans, was that existing federal regulation of mutual funds was sufficient.91
Plan service providers, including those that receive revenuesharing, typically avoid ERISA fiduciary status in one of two ways. First,
they may not exercise the discretion that is required by the statute for
fiduciary status. For example, entities that provide recordkeeping and
similar services may successfully argue that they merely administer the

to investment duties). ERISA’s other fiduciary standards require benefit plan
fiduciaries to minimize the risk of large losses by diversifying plan investments,
ERISA § 404(a)(1)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C) (2006), and to act in accordance
with plan documents, ERISA § 404(a)(1)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (2006).
88
ERISA § 406(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1) (2006).
89
ERISA § 3(21)(a)(ii), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(a)(ii) (2006).
90
See ERISA § 3(21)(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(b) (2006).
91
See U.S. Dep’t of Labor Adv. Op. 2009-04A (Dec. 4. 2009) (stating that
“Congress concluded that it did not need to apply ERISA’s fiduciary rules to the
operation of mutual funds in addition to the Investment Company Act’s regulatory
scheme.”).
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terms of the plan and that does not constitute the fiduciary exercise of
discretion.92
Second, some providers of investment advice to plans and
participants may rely on an early DOL regulation that narrowly defined the
provision of fiduciary investment advice. Under that regulation, issued in
1975 when DB plans were typical, an investment adviser is not a fiduciary
when giving advice regarding benefit plan assets or an Individual
Retirement Account (IRA) unless the adviser (1) advises on securities
valuation or makes recommendations on the purchase or sale of securities,
(2) on a regular basis, (3) according to a mutual agreement with the plan or
a plan fiduciary, (4) that provides the advice will serve as the primary basis
for decisions on investments, and (5) the advice is individualized to the
plan’s needs.93 For example, entities that provide advice to employers on
the selection of plan investments can avoid fiduciary status by providing
the advice on a one time, rather than ongoing, basis.
The DOL recognizes that this narrow definition of fiduciary
investment advice no longer has currency in the 401(k) plan environment.
In 2010, the agency proposed regulations that would have dramatically
increased the scope of financial advisory activities that result in a provider
becoming a fiduciary when giving investment advice regarding benefit plan
or IRA assets. The proposed regulatory definition tracked the general
statutory definition and specifically stated that investment advice or
recommendations given to a plan participant or beneficiary or to an
investor regarding an IRA are a fiduciary act.94 After widespread objection
from the financial services sector, the DOL withdrew the proposed
regulations.95 Current indications are that the agency plans to revise and repropose the regulations.96
92

See e.g., Hecker v. Deere, 556 F.3d 575, 584 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that
the plan’s service provider was not a fiduciary because it did not exercise
discretion in plan administration or with respect to plan management); cf. Tussey
v. ABB, Inc., No. 2:06-CV-04305-NKL, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45240, at *100-01
(W.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012).
93
Definition of the Term ‘Fiduciary’, 75 Fed. Reg. 65,263, 65,265 (proposed
Oct. 22, 2010).
94
Id. at 65,277.
95
Labor Department’s EBSA to repropose rule on definition of a fiduciary,
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (Sept. 19, 2011), http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/ebsa/
EBSA20111382.htm.
96
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Conflict of Interest Rule – Investment Advice, FEDERAL
REGISTER (2013), available at http://www.federalregister.gov/regulations/1210-
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ERISA’s exclusion of mutual funds from fiduciary status and de
facto exclusion of nearly any service provider that wants to be excluded
leaves employers holding the fiduciary bag for 401(k) plans. Jurisprudence
and DOL authority make clear that ERISA’s fiduciary definition
encompasses certain acts of employers that sponsor a benefit plan,
including the selection and monitoring of plan investments.97 Employers
may form a committee of employees to select and monitor plan investments
or otherwise delegate those functions. In such an instance the employer
remains a fiduciary for the appointment and monitoring of its agents and
the agents are ERISA fiduciaries for the discretionary functions delegated
to them.98
In September 2006, employees began alleging that fiduciary
violations by employers resulted in inappropriately high 401(k) plan fees
that in turn negatively affected the employees’ account balances.99 A
complete analysis of the litigation involving plan fees is beyond the scope
of this Article. It is useful, though, to consider one of the more prominent
cases in order to categorize the types of responsibility employers face with
respect to the use of revenue sharing in their 401(k) plans.

AB32/conflict-of-interest-rule-investment-advice (targeting October 2013 for
reproposal).
97
See, e.g., Quan v. Computer Sci. Corp., 623 F.3d 870, 880-81 (9th Cir.
2010) (finding that employer-fiduciary’s choice of investments was entitled to
deference); Final Regulation Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account
Plans (ERISA Section 404(c) Plans, 57 Fed. Reg. 46,906, 46,924 n.27 (Oct. 16,
1991) (“Thus . . . the plan fiduciary has a fiduciary obligation to prudently select
such [investment options], as well as a residual fiduciary obligation to periodically
evaluate the performance of such [investment options].”); see also 29 C.F.R. §
2550.404c-5(b)(2) (2012) (“Nothing in this [regulation] shall relieve a fiduciary
from his or her duties under . . . ERISA to prudently select and monitor any
qualified default investment alternative under the plan or from any liability that
results from a failure to satisfy these duties, including liability for any resulting
losses.”). But see Hecker, 556 F.3d at 586 (leaving open the issue of “whether [the
plan sponsor’s] decision to restrict the direct investment choices in its Plans . . . is
even a decision within [the plan sponsor’s] fiduciary responsibilities.”), order
denying rehearing en banc, 569 F.3d 708 (7th Cir. 2009).
98
See Mark Casciari & Ian Morrison, Should the Securities Exchange Act be
the Sole Federal Remedy for an ERISA Fiduciary Misrepresentation of the Value
of Public Employer Stock?, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 637, 643 (2006).
99
See Chris Thixton, A 401(k) Fee Lawsuit First, PENSION CONSULTANTS INC.
(Nov. 17, 2009), http://pension-consultants.com/2009/11/fee-lawsuit/.
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In Tussey v. ABB, Inc., 401(k) plan participants alleged, among
other things, that their employer, ABB, Inc. (ABB), violated its fiduciary
duties when making decisions on matters that involved revenue sharing.100
First, ABB allegedly permitted Fidelity Trust, the 401(k) plan’s
recordkeeper, to receive such extensive revenue sharing payments that
Fidelity Trust’s compensation became excessive.101 The excessive
compensation allegedly subsidized work on non-401(k) plans that Fidelity
Trust did for ABB. ABB failed to convince the court that it appropriately
monitored the fees Fidelity Trust received.102 According to the court, ABB
was primarily concerned with minimizing its own costs rather than with
ensuring the plan participants did not overpay Fidelity Trust.103
Second, the participants argued that ABB had violated its fiduciary
obligations when it deleted one mutual fund offering and selected or kept
other funds as part of the plan’s investment menu.104 The court determined
that ABB inappropriately considered the “effect of the fund selected on
recordkeeping fees, and what changes to the fee structure were in [ABB’s]
best interest” when replacing one fund with another.105 ABB also decided
to offer some share classes in the plan that charged higher fees to
participants, and thus paid more in revenue sharing, than paid by other
lower-fee share classes of the same funds that were available to the plan.106
The court held the ABB fiduciaries jointly and severally liable for $34.2
million as a result of these fiduciary breaches.107
The Tussey decision illustrates that employers have two primary
responsibilities when considering the use and scope of revenue sharing.
First, the duties of loyalty and care require employers to ensure that any
compensation paid by the plan, directly or indirectly, to its service
providers is reasonable. Second, employers must act loyally and prudently
when choosing and designating the investments offered to employees.

100

Tussey v. ABB, Inc., No. 2:06-CV-04305-NKL, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
45240, at *100-01 (Mar. 31, 2012).
101
See id. at *28.
102
Id. at *29.
103
Id. at *31.
104
See id. at *47-48.
105
Id. at *57.
106
See id. at *79.
107
Id. at *116. The court awarded the plaintiffs an additional $1.7 million due
to ABB’s failure to monitor the way a Fidelity entity administered float income.
Id.
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In sum, ERISA’s fiduciary framework, which was developed
during an era of DB plan dominance, imposes significant responsibility on
employers who sponsor 401(k) plans. Among those responsibilities is an
obligation to select both plan service providers and the investments offered
in the plan in accordance with fiduciary standards of loyalty and prudence.
In contrast, ERISA generally does not impose fiduciary duties on either
plan service providers or the providers of mutual funds offered as plan
investments. Revenue sharing, which is frequently used to pay some or all
of the costs of 401(k) plan administration, illustrates the challenges and
burdens this regulatory approach poses for employers.
IV.

EMPLOYERS AND 401(K) FIDUCIARY DUTIES

In this Part, I briefly explain the way employers’ roles have
changed as a result of the transition from a DB pension system to one that
primarily relies on DC plans such as 401(k) plans. The basic alignment of
interests that supported the choice of an employer-centric fiduciary
framework for DB plan investments no longer exists. Furthermore,
employers do not inherently have the expertise to select and monitor
financial products targeted to individual investors or the way in which the
product providers interact with other actors in the financial and 401(k)
systems.
Contributing to the task for employers are information
asymmetries between employers and providers of 401(k) services and
investment products. The Part concludes with a brief discussion of
alternative regulatory approaches.
A. EMPLOYER INTERESTS AND EXPERTISE IN THE 401(K) PLAN
SYSTEM
The role employers play in the retirement plans that they
voluntarily sponsor has shifted significantly since ERISA’s fiduciary
provisions were enacted in 1974. ERISA requires employers to fund DB
plans they sponsor to whatever degree necessary to enable the plans to pay
promised benefits.108 That means that employers with DB plans have a
direct interest in plan investments and in the fees charged to the plans.
108

See Dana M. Muir, Counting the Cash: Disclosure and Cash Balance
Plans, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 849, 869 (2004) (“[E]mployers retain the
obligation to fully fund a DB plan should investment returns not meet expectations
. . .”).
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Positive investment returns reduce an employer’s funding obligation, and
every dollar of cost the plan pays in fees is a dollar that the employer must
contribute to the plan. In addition, employers have full control over DB
plan investment decision-making. The alignment of the employer’s
interests with the plan beneficiaries’ interests favors treating the employers
as plan fiduciaries.
In the 401(k) paradigm, employers’ interests are less closely
aligned with the retirement plan policy goal of maximizing employee
opportunity to achieve lifelong financial security. Most 401(k) plans
delegate to employees the decision on how to invest their account assets.109
As a result, employers no longer control how plan assets are invested. Nor
do employers have any direct interest in the investment returns. The
investment vehicles used in 401(k) plans may be significantly different
from those in DB plans. 401(k) investments must be suitable for the varied
needs of participants, which depend on demographic and risk factors as
well as plan scale. Since the plan service provider fees are typically paid
either directly or indirectly by the participants, employers may be largely
indifferent to the amount of those fees or the way in which they are charged
to participants.
The change in the alignment of interests is not the only factor that
favors reallocation of the fiduciary obligations in 401(k) plans. Employers,
especially small ones, may not have the expertise to evaluate the financial
products offered on their 401(k) plan menu. There is nothing in the
business model of non-financial sector employers to lead a reasonable
observer to believe that employers have the professional proficiency in
financial planning necessary to decide on the appropriate set of investment
choices to be offered to employees. Nor are employers necessarily
knowledgeable about the increasing complexities of financial products and
how those products operate within the larger 401(k) system that
encompasses a range of service providers such as broker-dealers, financial
planners, and record keepers.
A variety of factors contribute to the complexity involved in 401(k)
plans. One is the number of different services and providers that the plan
may need.110 The size of a 401(k) plan can cut both ways in terms of
complexity. The problem for small plans is that they need many of the
109

See Davis, supra note 73, at 1028 (explaining that approximately 96% of
all individuals actively participating in 401(k) plans have both the right and the
responsibility to choose how to invest their account assets).
110
See Hutcheson, supra note 3, at 344-47.
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same services and must meet many of the same compliance requirements as
large plans but have fewer participants and lower levels of plan assets to
bear those costs.111 Larger plans tend to have lower per-participant fees
because of the economies of scale those plans can achieve.112 Large plans
may be challenged, though, to meet the diversity of interests that naturally
occurs among a large participant population. Finally, as employers
examine their plan costs and compare those costs with those of other plans,
the employers must consider the qualitative differences among the plans.
An employer’s fiduciary obligation does not require it to offer a low-cost
plan. Instead, it requires the employer to act prudently and to ensure the
plan service providers are not overcompensated for the services that they
render.113
A concern related to complexity and limited employer expertise is
that employers suffer from information asymmetry on revenue sharing and
other compensation and fees in the investment industry as compared to plan
service providers and mutual funds. The 2012 GAO report found that some
plan sponsors were not aware of financial arrangements among service
providers and investment products or, if generally aware, did not
understand the amount or use of those fees.114 Some of the GAO’s findings
are astonishing in the extent to which employers are unaware of or do not
consider revenue-sharing when making plan-related decisions. Almost half
of the surveyed plan sponsors did not know if revenue-sharing occurred in
their 401(k) plan.115 And a number of employers that knew revenue sharing
occurred within their plan admitted they did not consider the revenue
sharing compensation when selecting plan service providers.116 In some
instances, the GAO cross-checked the fee data reported by the employers
who participated in its study. One example the GAO gave is that of a large
plan that paid 16 times more in fees for administrative services and recordkeeping during one year than the employer had reported.117 Presumably,

111

See GAO, supra note 27, at 15.
See id.
113
See DEP’T OF LABOR, Meeting Your Fiduciary Responsibilities 5 (2012)
(“[F]iduciaries will want to understand the fees and expenses charged and the
services provided”), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/meetingyour
fiduciaryresponsibilities.pdf.
114
See GAO, supra note 27, at 13-14, 16-21.
115
Id. at 25.
116
Id.
117
Id. at 27.
112
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the employer did not understand the extent of the fees being paid within its
plan.
One might assume that the disclosure obligations imposed by the
DOL on plan service providers beginning in 2012 would eliminate this
asymmetry. However, experts in retirement system fees and the new
disclosures explain that service providers are going to considerable lengths
to make the mandated fee disclosures difficult for employers to
comprehend and analyze.118 One commentator refers to the disclosures as
“dizzyingly complex.”119 Discussing plan sponsor obligations in evaluating
the disclosures, one plan consultant said “[t]he time it takes – and the
attention to detail it takes – is more than sponsors can handle.”120
Fewer than 60% of full time U.S. workers in the private sector
have any access to a retirement plan.121 A well-functioning regulatory
system would encourage employers to increase their sponsorship of
retirement plans.
Assigning fiduciary obligation and liability for
investment selection and monitoring to employers who voluntarily sponsor
401(k) plans does not take advantage of a strong alignment between the
interests of employers and employees because no such alignment exists.
Nor does designating employers as fiduciaries utilize expertise that they
naturally have in running their businesses because few employers naturally
develop expertise in the complexities of investment products intended for
individuals. It appears that even extensive disclosure requirements may not
entirely eliminate information asymmetries that increase the challenges
participants face in meeting their ERISA fiduciary obligations.
The observation that employers may not be the best-placed of the
entire constellation of actors in the 401(k) plan system to bear the
responsibility and liability associated with approval and monitoring of the
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use of revenue sharing is not incompatible with a regulatory system that
appropriately protects employees. Instead the observation provides a
rationale for a careful examination of that constellation of actors and the
various roles they should play in a properly performing 401(k) system.
B. PROPOSALS TO REALLOCATE FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITY
Numerous commentators and policy makers have offered proposals
intended to improve the 401(k) system. Some of those suggestions are
incremental and would have little or no effect on employer responsibility
for the use of revenue sharing.122 Other suggestions, some of which I
categorize below based on their approach to investments and briefly
discuss, would dramatically change the DC plan landscape. All of the
proposals discussed below address broad, systemic problems in the U.S.
DC system. However, I only discuss their implications for employer
fiduciary responsibility for plan investments.
In one category of proposals the federal government, or a
committee appointed by the government, would assume total or primary
responsibility for selection of the investments to be held in DC accounts.
Professor Theresa Ghilarducci has offered a schematic for a system that
would entirely replace the current DC system, which she calls Guaranteed
Retirement Accounts (GRAs).123 The board of the Thrift Savings Plan
(TSP), which administers and invests the DC accounts of federal
employees, would invest GRA assets.124 Professor Ghilarducci’s plan
would guarantee a three percent investment return in GRAs.125 During
periods of economic stress, GRA assets and the three percent return would
122
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be protected. On the other hand, the accounts would receive only limited
returns during robust financial market periods. Employers would have no
responsibility or liability for the investments held in GRAs.
Professor Jeff Schwartz has proposed a government-run system of
individual accounts that, like Professor Ghilarducci’s, would replace 401(k)
plans.126 One role of the government would be to designate a private sector
fund manager to invest account assets, although Professor Schwartz allows
that the system may provide some opportunity for employees to select their
own investments.127 The default investment product to be managed by the
government-appointed manager would consist of a portfolio made up of a
U.S. equity index fund and treasury-inflation protected securities (TIPS).128
While not formally promising a guaranteed minimum investment return,
the use of TIPS is intended to provide a “guarantee[d] return of principal in
real terms at retirement.”129 The allocation between the equity index fund
and TIPS, and thus the effective guarantee, would vary according to
employee age.130 As with Professor Ghilarducci’s plan, employers would
not have any role or liability in the selection of account investments.
A second category of reform proposal would retain many of the
contours of the existing 401(k) plan system but would make changes to the
investment component of the system. One plan receiving significant
attention is sponsored by Senator Tom Harkin.131 If adopted, his proposal
would require any employer not offering a DB or DC plan that meets
minimum criteria to enroll employees into a newly-created type of private
sector pension plan, a Universal, Secure, and Adaptable (USA) Retirement
Fund.132 Senator Harkin’s proposal only provides the broad details of how
USA Retirement Funds would work. There are indications that employees
would have individual accounts because the proposal states that “[t]he
amount of a person’s monthly benefit would be determined based on the
total amount of contributions made by, or on behalf of, the participant and
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investment performance over time.”133 However, the proposal also
contemplates risk sharing, the type and amount of which is ambiguous.
The risk sharing delegates to the trustees of each fund the flexibility to
gradually increase or decrease benefits depending on investment
performance.134 Such sharing of risks is incompatible with a system that
calculates individual benefits based purely on account balances.
The fiduciary responsibility for USA Retirement Funds would lie
with the fund trustees charged with plan management.135 Trustees would
represent various constituencies: employees, retirees and employers.136
USA Retirement Funds would be licensed by an unspecified entity.137
Employers would not have any fiduciary liability for the selection of a
USA Retirement Fund for their employees and, in fact, would be permitted
to “use the ‘default’ fund identified for the region, industry, or through
collective bargaining.”138 Presumably a federal agency would determine the
default fund for various regions and industries. Senator Harkin’s plan does
not seem to address the responsibility and liability for investments of
employers that choose to offer their own DC plan rather than enrolling their
employees in a USA retirement fund.
Elsewhere, I have proposed a system that is similar to Senator
Harkin’s in that it would leave intact much of the present 401(k)
framework.139 It would decrease employer liability for investment selection
and provide added incentives for plan sponsorship by offering additional
liability protections for small employers.140 My proposal is centered on a
new type of investment product, Safe Harbor Automated Retirement
Product (SHARPs).141 In lieu of employer fiduciary obligation for
SHARPs, I propose a two-part mechanism consisting of: (1) assigning
fiduciary responsibility to the investment managers and fund directors that
determine and implement a SHARP’s investment strategy; and (2)
licensing by and reporting to a federal regulatory agency. Disclosure
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requirements would promote the ability to make competitive comparisons
among SHARPs.142
The investment strategy of SHARPs is critical to employees’
wealth accumulation. SHARPs would be permitted to use any investment
strategy that would currently meet the Qualified Default Investment
Alternative requirements imposed by the DOL as part of a safe harbor for
default plan investments in automatic enrollment 401(k) plans.143 To drive
investor-focused performance and low fees, the investment managers of
SHARPs would have fiduciary liability to act in the best interest of the
participants, including determination, disclosure, and implementation of an
appropriate asset allocation strategy.144 As a final check, the board
members of a SHARP would be responsible for its compliance with
regulatory standards and its disclosed strategy.145
My SHARPs proposal is based, with appropriate adaptations for
the U.S. system, on Australia’s implementation of MySuper investment
products. Elsewhere, I have described Australia’s approach to private
sector pension provision in greater detail.146 Relevant here is that after the
global financial crisis Australia undertook a review of its retirement
system.147 The final reform recommendations were extensive.148 One
component addressed the default investment vehicles used for the accounts
of employees who do not designate their investment choices. Default
investment products are in extensive use in Australia because many
Australians are passive with respect to their investments, do not make
active plan choices, and have limited financial literacy.149 In the reformed
system, MySuper products will be the only permitted type of default
investment product. In addition, employees who wish to make explicit
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investment decisions may designate a MySuper product to receive their
retirement plan contributions.150
The regulatory framework is relatively simple. The Australian
Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA) will gather and make public data
on MySuper product performance and fees to facilitate competition among
the offerings.151 The regulatory approach to MySuper default products
imposes an enhanced set of duties on MySuper fund entity trustees
(sometimes referred to as corporate trustees)152 and on the boards that
govern the entity trustees.153 Employers play no significant role and have
no significant liability in this system. The enhanced obligations of
MySuper entity and individual trustees essentially will operate as an
additional layer of duties on top of the basic set of requirements that applies
to all entity trustees of funds that hold retirement assets.154 In addition,
trustees must be licensed and meet specific standards with respect to the
operation of a MySuper product.155
Unlike the employer-based retirement system in Australia, the U.S.
regulatory system currently relies on employers as the primary gatekeepers
and decisionmakers for 401(k) plan investments. This approach is a relic
of the period when DB plans were the predominant type of retirement plan.
In the context of the current DC system, employers’ interests do not
150
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strongly align with the interests of employees who invest through those
plans, typically do not have specialized expertise in investment products
targeted to individual investors, and suffer from information asymmetry as
compared to 401(k) plan service providers and entities such as mutual
funds that invest account assets.
A number of the proposals for reform of the U.S. 401(k) system
advocate decreasing the responsibility and liability employers face in
offering their employees the opportunity to use DC plans as a component
of the employees’ pursuit of lifelong financial security. Revenue-sharing is
a good example of the challenges employers confront in establishing
401(k) plan investment menus, monitoring those menus, and overseeing the
compensation of plan service providers. None of the proposals discussed
here would leave plan participants unprotected. Instead, the proposals
divide responsibility for investment oversight in various ways among the
federal government and the providers of investment products and 401(k)
services.
V.

CONCLUSION

Revenue sharing in 401(k) plans dates at least to the early 1990s.
It took some time, though, before revenue-sharing began to receive
significant attention from others than those who paid or received it. The
DOL recently has increased disclosure obligations to provide more
transparency on the compensation, including from revenue-sharing, which
service providers derive from 401(k) plans.
In addition to the disclosure obligations, ERISA imposes fiduciary
obligations and liability on employers for the selection and monitoring of
401(k) plan investments and service providers. Cases brought by
participants alleging excessive investment fees and service provider
compensation have highlighted these obligations, including the role played
by revenue sharing. But workers struggling to meet their survival needs
and save for the future deserve a better system. The current fiduciary
structure serves to discourage employers, particularly small employers,
who have neither the expertise nor the time to understand financial
products targeted at individual investors and the compensation practices,
including revenue-sharing, used in the financial sector, from establishing a
401(k) plan. In today’s competitive business environment, even large
employers may be reluctant to develop the expertise necessary to meet
ERISA’s substantive fiduciary standards. In short, revenue-sharing is but
one example, albeit an important one, of why the US needs to carefully
evaluate its approach to building retirement wealth for its workers.

